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The Putative Spouse and Marriage by Estoppel Doctrines: 
An “End Run Around Marriage” or Just a Marriage? 
 
 Dana E. Prescott, Esq., Ph.D* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
For generations in the United States, each state determined the 
definition of a legally recognized marriage.1 Indeed, the United 
States Supreme Court long ago held that marriage “has always been 
subject to the control of the [state] legislature.”2  For the most part, 
these early notions of “federalism”3 permitted states to constrain the 
definition of a lawful marriage.  States did so without much public 
controversy; at least when consistent with socially and legally 
                                                                                                                                  
*Dana E. Prescott is licensed to practice in Maine and Massachusetts and a 
partner with Prescott, Jamieson, & Murphy Law Group LLC, Saco, Maine. Dr. 
Prescott holds an MSW and PhD in social work. He is a Fellow of the 
International Academy of Family Attorneys and the American Academy of 
Matrimonial Lawyers. He may be contacted at dana@southernmainelaw.com. 
1The political and historical reasons are important though beyond the scope of 
this paper. Mark E. Brandon, Family at the Birth of American Constitutional 
Order, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1195, 1199 (1998) (“First, conceptions of the family 
played an important role in imagining and establishing political authority in 
England and in her colonies in North America. Second, subtle shifts in the 
character and function of the institution of the family engendered basic changes 
in new world political ideology, especially with respect to authority. Third, these 
changes in turn precipitated the separation of the colonies from the mother 
country and eventually the establishment of substantially new political 
institutions.”). 
2Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888); but see Cleveland v. United States, 
329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946) (“The fact that the regulation of marriage is a state 
matter does not, of course, make the Mann Act an unconstitutional interference 
by Congress with the police powers of the States.”). 
3See Martin Diamond, “The Federalist” on Federalism: “Neither a National 
Nor a Federal Constitution, But a Composition of Both,” 86 Yale L.J. 1273, 
1273 (1977), for an essay which captures the subtle originations and meaning of 
this term  (“Indeed, as we shall see, most contemporary definitions of federalism 
are little more than generalized descriptions of the way we Americans divide 
governing power between the states and the central government.”); see also 
Dana E. Prescott, The Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor: Why the 
“Death” of Fungible Federalism after a Century of Convenience?, 26 J. AM. 
ACAD. MATRIM. LAW., 51 (2013), for a discussion of federalism in the context of 
marriage. 
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accepted discrimination against groups defined by race, socio-
economic class, and other legally and socially constructed 
categories.4 Virulent strains of discrimination and privilege in the 
19th and 20th centuries restricted which groups of Americans were 
worthy of the right to a lawfully recognized marriage and the 
societal and legal benefits flowing from that status. For these 
decades, the controversy in state courts and legislatures was much 
more about how to maintain and enforce exclusions rather than 
expanding inclusion.5 
In the 1940s, however, a doctrine of federalism began to 
emerge which implicated the primacy of state authority over family 
law, including divorce and the right to raise children without 
government interference (or perceived interference).6  Until this 
strain of federalism began to take root, litigation often concerned the 
legality of marriage or divorce, the derivative rights of inheritance, 
                                                                                                                                  
4See Fay Botham, Almighty God Created the Races: Christianity, Interracial 
Marriage, & American Law (2009); Peter Wallenstein, Tell the Court I Love My 
Wife: Race, Marriage, and Law—An American History (2002); Jaime M. Gher, 
Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage—Allies or Adversaries Within the Same-Sex 
Marriage Movement, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 559 (2008); Richard 
Lewis Jr. & Joanne Ford-Robertson, Understanding the Occurrence of 
Interracial Marriage in the United States Through Differential Assimilation, 41 
J. BLACK STUD. 405 (2010). 
5See, e.g., Davenport v. Caldwell, 10 S.C. 317, 338 (1878) (“There was no law 
forbidding marriage among slaves, but the intention of slavery made the right of 
property in the master paramount, and natural marriage could not be allowed to 
interfere with that power, but was absolutely subject thereto, and could be 
annulled at will; but that did not make it necessarily, and ab initio, a nullity 
between the parties. Such a view of marriage amongst slaves could not affect the 
rights of third parties, for it was impossible for any such rights to exist, as slaves 
could not acquire or hold property in their own right.”); Honey v. Clark, 37 Tex. 
686, 708 (1872) (“Prior to the emancipation of the slaves, marriage with that 
class was not, in a legal sense, authorized; yet there was that sort of 
contubernism among them which resulted in procreation of families. There was 
a certain degree of continence, and, to some extent at least, a moral observance 
of the matrimonial condition. This, but for the law of bondage, would have been 
regarded, in every sense, as legal marriage. The laws of slavery did not forbid 
the coupling together of man and woman in this manner, but none of the marital 
rights belonging to free and civilized society accompanied this cohabitation and 
sexual commerce.”). 
6See Ann Laquer Estin, Article: Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the 
Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 382 (2007) (“The federalism 
problem at the core of the divorce debate was ultimately truncated by the 
Supreme Court in a series of decisions that began in 1942. Acting on the basis of 
constitutional full faith and credit principles, the Court severed the connection 
between state power and marital status, changing the shape of both divorce law 
and American federalism.”). 
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the significance of coition and consummation, and the consequences 
for women and children when not of a legally-recognized marriage.7 
Moreover, during this era, child abuse and domestic violence 
had yet to emerge as a public health disease in which a victim could 
obtain civil restraining orders, or the state would seriously consider 
(short of death in too many cases) criminal charges. The powerful 
notion of children and wives as property by common law and 
legislation had embedded a deeply contorted right of privacy within 
the home as a means to protect abusers’ possession and control.8 
By the 1950s, marriage shifted to a model of the so-called 
“nuclear family” (later referred to as “intact”) but then trends 
beginning in the 1960s began to significantly alter society’s view of 
stereotypical images of marriage, gender roles, and the choice of 
                                                                                                                                  
7See Brooks-Bischoffberger v. Bischoffberger, 129 Me. 52, 54 (Me. 1930) 
(“Consummation by coition is unnecessary in the case of a ceremonial 
marriage.”); Home of Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208, 213 (Tex. 1965) 
(“The law favors legitimacy, and it is the public policy of our state as declared 
by the Legislature that the legitimacy of children shall not be affected by the 
divorce of their parents and that the issue of some utterly void marriages shall 
nevertheless be legitimate.”). For a broader discussion of this history , see 
Charles W. II Taintor, Legitimation, Legitimacy and Recognition in the Conflict 
of Laws, 18 CAN. B. REV. 589, 599 (1940) (“The solution which would more 
probably be selected by the courts is to prefer the status of legitimacy to that of 
bastardy and to hold the father alone to be bound and entitled. This would be in 
accord with the general feeling that legitimacy is the more noble status, a feeling 
which might override considerations of the possible factual benefit to the child 
arising from situations in which the mother is able to do much more for it than is 
the father.”). 
8See Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home is his Castle?”: Reflections on the 
Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth 
Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN L. 175, 184 (2002) (“Judicial doctrines 
concerning marital violence, interspousal tort suits, and spousal evidentiary 
privileges helped shield the family from legal interference and the glare of 
unwanted publicity. Insofar as there was a ‘right of privacy’ during the 
nineteenth century, it was closely tied to the four walls of a man’s home.”); 
Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 
105 THE YALE L.J. 2117, 2141 (1996) (“We are left with a striking portrait of 
legal change. Jurists and lawmakers emphatically repudiated the doctrine of 
marital chastisement, yet responded to marital violence erratically - often 
condoning it, and condemning it in circumstances suggesting little interest in the 
plight of battered wives. Given this record, how are we to make sense of 
chastisement’s demise?”); Natalie J. Sokoloff & Ida Dupont, Domestic Violence 
at the Intersections of Race, Class, and Gender: Challenges and Contributions 
to Understanding Violence Against Marginalized Women in Diverse 
Communities, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 38, 47 (2005) (“The belief that 
non-White others are said to engage in oppressive and misogynistic cultural 
practices fits long-standing biases and serves to downplay the existence of 
culturally prescribed and equally horrendous acts of violence against women in 
White Western communities.”). 
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cohabitation.9 What arose by the 1960s was an injection into state 
courts of constitutional law in the realm of due process and privacy 
rights, as well as early murmurings of civil rights derived from 
violence, race, and gender. This emerging admixture of federalism 
then blended by the 1970s, and decades following, with no-fault 
divorce, non-married parentage rights for fathers and mothers, the 
equal rights of fathers to child custody, feminism and the economic 
role and rights of women, the nascent emergence of independent 
rights for children, and, subsequently, the standing of grandparents 
and kinship to request some form of de facto parental rights from a 
court over the objection of biological parents.10 
This historic evolution in social welfare and family law policy 
was conjoined with a more refined and liberal version of the 
constitutional law of privacy, its connection to individual civil 
liberties, and movements to protect women and children from 
violence through civil and criminal law reforms.11 The emergence 
                                                                                                                                  
9See J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, The Winding Road from Form to 
Function: A Brief History of Contemporary Marriage, 21 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIM. LAW. 1, 1 (2008) (“Consider this contrast: American marriage was 
once ‘rigid, work-centered, custom regulated, with well-defined roles for 
husband, wife, and children,’ but now may be characterized as ‘flexible, 
pleasure-centered, co-operatively regulated, with loosely defined roles for 
husband, wife, and children.’”). 
10See June Carbone, Marriage as a State of Mind: Federalism, Contract, and the 
Expressive Interest in Family Law, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 49, 50 (“[T]he 
precise meaning of this ‘family law federalism,’ however, is open for 
renegotiation.”). For historical and policy discussions, see Mary Ann Mason, 
The Roller Coaster of Child Custody Law Over the Last Half Century, 24 J. AM. 
ACAD. MATRIM. LAW.451, 451 (2011) (“Welcome to the postmodern family, a 
landscape of various family configurations, not always united by marriage or 
related to the children by biology, where no clear rules prevail and the child is 
rarely given a voice when adults vie for her custody.”); Cynthia A. McNeely, 
Comment, Lagging Behind the Times: Parenthood, Custody, and Gender Bias in 
the Family Court, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 891, 906 (1998) (“As the twentieth 
century concludes, this country seems no closer to resolving child custody issues 
free of gender bias than it did in the days of the 1800s when fathers 
automatically received custody. Despite more than 150 years of evidence that 
custody decisions have been based largely on prevailing social and cultural roles 
and mandates for men and women, child custody in America today continues to 
be decided with only lip service to the holistic needs of children.”). 
11Even today, abuse remains an embedded public health and social justice 
problem. See United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1956 (2016) (“In 
response to the high incidence of domestic violence against Native American 
women, Congress [in 2005] enacted [18 U.S.C. § 117(a)] . . . [which targets] 
habitual offender[s].”) (citation omitted); Wee v. Eggener, 225 P.3d 1120, 1125 
(Alaska 2010) (“When a court finds a parent has a history of domestic violence, 
it generally can grant the perpetrating parent only supervised visitation.”) 
(footnote omitted). The history of reform at federal and state levels has been 
2020] Putative Spouse and Marriage by Estoppel Doctrines 55 
of constitutional and individual rights to be lawfully married without 
the bar of discrimination gained prominence with the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia,12 in 1967 which 
held unconstitutional government restrictions on interracial 
marriage. The constitutional tensions between state authority to 
identify and exclude certain groups by status remain today with 
recent decisions in United States v. Windsor13 and Obergefell v. 
Hodges14, defining a lawful marriage on constitutional grounds as 
including same-sex couples and requiring recognition of that lawful 
right to marriage and the concomitant right to dissolve that marriage 
in divorce in any other state. Between these federal cases, state 
appellate courts endorsed, with powerful rhetoric, the social and 
legal importance of the institution of marriage and the right of 
personal privacy as central to personal freedom, the core principles 
of American constitutional rights, and a bedrock of an egalitarian 
democracy.15 
                                                                                                                                  
extensively studied. See Vincent J. Felitti, et al., Relationship of Childhood 
Abuse and Household Dysfunction to Many of the Leading Causes of Death in 
Adults: The Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) Study, 56 AM. J. 
PREVENTATIVE MED. 774 (2019); Leonard Karp & Laura C. Belleau, Federal 
Law and Domestic Violence: The Legacy of the Violence Against Women Act, 16 
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 173 (1999). 
12Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). For a reminder of how much remains to 
change in the rigid minds of proponents of racism, see Paul A. Lombardo, 
Miscegenation, Eugenics, and Racism: Historical Footnotes to Loving v. 
Virginia, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421, 422 (1988) (“Loving invalidated a Virginia 
statute that forbade marriages between white persons and persons of other races. 
Thus, Loving struck down one of the most psychologically and socially sensitive 
laws upon which the American system of apartheid had rested for over three 
hundred years.”). This rights-language has now entered the uniquely American 
realm of free speech. See, e.g., Telescope Media Group v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 
752 (8th Cir. 2019) (“Minnesota’s interpretation of the MHRA interferes with 
the Larsens’ speech in two overlapping ways. First, it compels the Larsens to 
speak favorably about same-sex marriage if they choose to speak favorably 
about opposite-sex marriage. Second, it operates as a content-based regulation of 
their speech.”). 
13United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
14Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
15See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) 
(“Marriage is a vital social institution. The exclusive commitment of two 
individuals to each other nurtures love and mutual support; it brings stability to 
our society. For those who choose to marry, and for their children, marriage 
provides an abundance of legal, financial, and social benefits. In return it 
imposes weighty legal, financial, and social obligations.”). See also, Id. at 955, 
where the Court goes on to state that, “[b]ecause it fulfils yearnings for security, 
safe haven, and connection that express our common humanity, civil marriage is 
an esteemed institution, and the decision whether and whom to marry is among 
life’s momentous acts of self-definition. Tangible as well as intangible benefits 
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A brief historical perspective is relevant because, concurrent 
with these societal and institutional evolutions, a swath of adults in 
the United States were voluntarily cohabitating without marriage, 
acquiring and owning assets jointly without marriage, and having 
children without marriage.16 What concerns this article, however, is 
the portion of couples who made a voluntary and intentional choice 
to be married, publicly and legally (such as joint tax returns), and 
behaved as such. What they failed to do was to complete technical 
state law requirements for marriage so as to render a marriage void 
or voidable at the time of divorce if one putative spouse decided to 
gain a coldly rational advantage.17 In addition, these couples may 
live in states which do not recognize common law marriage, nor do 
they fall within the ambit of a constitutionally protected class of 
rights.18 
                                                                                                                                  
flow from marriage. The marriage license grants valuable property rights to 
those who meet the entry requirements, and who agree to what might otherwise 
be a burdensome degree of government regulation of their activities.” This point 
of privacy in marriage, however, should not be read too broadly. See, e.g., 
Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Alaska, 378 F.3d 1232, 1242-43 (11th Cir. 2004), 
rev’d, 220 F. Supp. 2d, 1257 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (“After an extensive survey of the 
history of sex in American culture and law—replete with cites to the Kinsey 
studies and Michel Foucault—the district court concluded that ‘there exists a 
constitutionally inherent right to sexual privacy that firmly encompasses state 
non-interference with private, adult, consensual sexual relationships.’ . . . The 
inquiry should have been focused not broadly on the vast topic of sex in 
American cultural and legal history, but narrowly and more precisely on the 
treatment of sexual devices within that history and tradition.”). 
16See Andrew J. Cherlin, Demographic Trends in the United States: A Review of 
Research in the 2000s, 72 J. MARRIAGE FAM. 403, 413-14 (2010) (“Cohabiting 
relationships may not have a clear beginning point. Single parents and their 
adolescents often disagree on whether new, seemingly cohabiting partners are 
part of the family. The cross-household ties that multiple partner fertility can 
create may lead to families without clear boundaries.”); Sara McLanahan, 
Diverging Destinies: How Children are Faring Under the Second Demographic 
Transition, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607, 607 (2004) (“How children are faring under 
the second demographic transition, which began around 1960, is less certain. 
The primary trends of the second transition include delays in fertility and 
marriage; increases in cohabitation, divorce, and nonmarital childbearing; and 
increases in maternal employment.”); see also discussion infra note 28-31. 
17From the perspective of rational choice, error may not have a moral 
component. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychological Foundations of 
Behavioral Law and Economics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV.1675, 1687 (“Research on 
judgment and choice that uses the perspective of ecological rationality can thus 
help pinpoint when people are vulnerable to errors and when they are not. It can 
also lead to useful ways to facilitate better judgment. This perspective, however, 
should not reassure conventional law and economics scholars that cognitive 
mistakes are not real or are not pervasive.”). 
18See Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1998) (“Nothing we say 
here today is intended to derogate from the clear distinction we have made in 
2020] Putative Spouse and Marriage by Estoppel Doctrines 57 
As explored in this article, the choice to deny a marriage for the 
economic or personal advantage of one person may not matter in the 
context of social and political equity19 as some states have found a 
pathway for supporting, as valid, a marriage grounded in two 
equitable doctrines: the putative spouse doctrine [PSD] and the 
doctrine of marriage by estoppel [DME].20 In this article, these 
doctrines are explored in the context of pronouncements about the 
value of marriage to a robust and civil society and the concomitant 
rights and responsibilities which flow from the status of marriage. 
Besides extensive federal and state benefits, the underlying 
“partnership theory of marriage” of divorce now decades old, 
conferred significant economic rights to equitable distribution and 
spousal support not available to cohabitating couples or voided 
marriages.21 
                                                                                                                                  
our cases between the legal rights of married and unmarried cohabitants”). The 
breadth of rhetoric between majority and dissenting opinions in marriage cases 
could be an article onto itself (and an even longer footnote). See, e.g., 
Donaldson v. State, 292 P.3d 364, 375 (Mont. 2012) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (“It 
appears that a majority of voters in these states have seen through the scare 
tactics and propaganda which ‘family values’ organizations and certain religious 
groups have used to persuade the electorate that allowing same-sex marriage 
will harm children, hurt businesses and the economy, intrude on religious 
freedoms, and undermine the institution of marriage itself.”). No discussion of 
this sort can ignore one line of reasoning from one judge because this strain is 
proving immune to ordinary societal antibiotics. See In re. King, 200 So. 3d 495, 
565 (Ala. 2016) (Moore, C.J., concurring specially) (“Based upon arguments of 
‘love,’ ‘commitment,’ and ‘equal dignity’ for same-sex couples, five lawyers, as 
Chief Justice Roberts so aptly describes the Obergefell majority, have declared a 
new social policy for the entire country. As the Chief Justice and Associate 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito eloquently and accurately demonstrate in 
their dissents, the majority opinion in Obergefell is an act of raw power with no 
ascertainable foundation in the Constitution itself. The majority presumed to 
legislate for the entire country under the guise of interpreting the Constitution.”). 
19See Miliano v. Miliano, 50 A.3d 534, 539 n.3 (Me. 2012) (“The use of the 
terms ‘equitable’ and ‘equity’ often create confusion. In common parlance, 
‘equitable’ can simply connote the general concepts of fairness and 
impartiality—as in the requirement of 19-A M.R.S. § 953(1) (2011) that 
distributions of marital property be ‘just’—or it can be used to describe the grant 
of authority for a court to exercise jurisdiction over specific claims arising from 
the law of equity.”). 
20To date, the author could not find a case applying these doctrines to a same sex 
couple but, given the holdings cited, if a state recognizes a marriage as lawful, 
then the courts should recognize the right to divorce. See Williams v. Williams, 
97 P.3d 1124 (Nev. 2004) (describing the putative spouse doctrine); 
Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss, 579 A.2d 377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (describing 
the doctrine of marriage by estoppel). 
21States, with variation, have adopted concepts of equitable distribution or 
community property from the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Law’s adoption of the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT 
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Because the argument here endorses the consequences of 
choice, not constricting it, Section II will discuss “common law 
marriage,” as a doctrine rooted in policies and practices now 
centuries old. In Section III, a 2019 case, Belliveau v. Whalen,22 in 
which the Maine Supreme Judicial Court referred, euphemistically, 
to these equitable doctrines as an “end-run around those [statutory 
marriage] requirements” and thereby denied equity in a 26-year 
marriage will be reviewed.23 Majority and dissenting opinions from 
other cases adopting or rejecting these doctrines will then be 
discussed in Section IV.24  From this analysis, it is argued in Section 
V that legislatures and courts should adopt a modern version of 
common law marriage, bounded by doctrines like putative marriage 
and estoppel and now  undergirded by contemporary policies 
established in the marriage cases from federal and state courts. Such 
a social and legal policy supports the presumption that marriage, 
with all the attendant rights and responsibilities, is a more effective 
alternative for society than stigma, illegitimacy, and economic 
instability for a maturely, publicly, and intentionally consummated 
partnership.25 
                                                                                                                                  
(1971). For the history of the uniform laws and California’s community property 
doctrine, see GRACE GANZ BLUMBERG, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 
(7th ed. 2016). Equitable distribution laws remain deeply rooted in that 
principle. See Burrow v. Burrow, 100 A.3d 1104, 1108 (Me. 2014), (“The 
evolution of the law of marital property reflects the shared or joint enterprise 
theory of marriage.”); Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70, 76 (Me. 1979) (“The 
“partnership theory of marriage is a major guiding principal in the separation 
and division of property at divorce.”). See Karen Townsend, Comment, The 
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act: New Statutory Solutions to Old Problems, 
37 MONT. L. REV. 119, 126-27 (1976) (“This provision [UMDA in Montana] 
reflects a new notion that the disposition of property is to be done ‘like the 
distribution of assets incident to the dissolution of a partnership.’”). 
22Belliveau v. Whalen, 213 A.3d 617 (Me. 2019). By way of disclosure, the 
author was counsel for the father and husband at the hearing and on appeal. 
23Id. at 618. 
24This policy tension is not limited to the United States. See Bradley S. Smith, 
Rethinking the Application of the Putative Spouse Doctrine in South African 
Matrimonial Property Law, 24 INT’L. J. L., POL’Y FAM. 267, 269-70 (2010) (“In 
South African law, the term ‘putative marriage’ (matrimonium putativum) refers 
to the specific instance where a void marriage is visited with limited legal 
consequences despite its invalidity provided that at least one of the parties to the 
marriage in good faith believed it to be valid. The bona fides of at least one of 
the ‘spouses’ constitutes the raison d’être for the putative marriage in that the 
law attempts to avoid the harsh consequences of total invalidity that would 
otherwise ensue.”). 
25Legitimizing children for inheritance and labeling children born outside 
marriage were not trivial matters. See Robinson v. Ruprecht, 61 N.E. 631, 634 
(Ill. 1901) (“The common law of England recognized no mode of legitimating 
bastards except by a special act of parliament. In the absence of statutory 
2020] Putative Spouse and Marriage by Estoppel Doctrines 59 
 
II. THE “WICKED” POLICY OF NOT-A-MARRIAGE 
 
Despite decades of constitutional law and political rhetoric in 
support of the value of marriage to society, barriers to lawful 
marriage remained  present in scenarios involving technical 
violations of statutory requirements or whether the birth of children 
or coition matter.26  What should matter, as it pertains to marriage 
and public policy, is that respect for individual self-determination 
and choice carries consequences if there is objective evidence of an 
intent to be married such as by ceremony or filing married joint tax 
returns.27 As more specifically described below, the consequences 
to effective policy design and implementation, therefore, in a 
democratic republic, means recognizing that  social evolutions (and 
pendulum swings which still require a modicum of civil discourse 
                                                                                                                                  
enactments, the common law rule would be the law in Illinois. The rule visited 
the sins of the parents upon the unoffending offspring and could not long 
survive the truer sense of justice and broader sense of charity that came with the 
advancing enlightenment and civilization of the race.”) (citations omitted). 
26See DiFonzo &. Stern, supra n.9, at 9-10 (“Common law marriage, because it 
frustrated state efforts to determine who could marry and procreate, was 
recognized in only eighteen states in the early 1950s. When a jurisdiction 
retained common law marriage, it did so to ‘regularize unions which the parties 
were otherwise free to abandon at will and to prevent the bastardization of 
children.’”); see also Inhabitants of Hiram v. Pierce, 45 Me. 367, 371 (1858) 
(‘In the absence of any provision of statute declaring marriages between parties 
of certain ages absolutely void, all marriages regularly made, according to the 
common law, are valid and binding, although had in violation of the specific 
regulations imposed by statute.’) (citation omitted). 
27There are limits on equity, however, when parties to the relationship may 
violate other public policies. See, e.g., Norton v. McOsker, 407 F.3d 501, 509 
(1st Cir. 2005) (“Unfortunately for Norton, who waited twenty-three years for 
an adulterer to finally leave his wife for good so that they could get married and 
live happily ever after, her happy ending never came to pass. Hoyt instead 
decided to end the relationship with Norton, having never left his wife. While 
society does not favor the actions taken by Hoyt in his relationships, Rhode 
Island law does not provide Norton with a cause of action for palimony arising 
out of her nonmarital relationship with Hoyt, nor is she able to succeed in a 
promissory estoppel claim because she has failed to meet the first two, if not all 
three of the elements of said claim.”); Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672, 674 (Nev. 
1984) (“We hasten to point out that Nevada does not recognize common law 
marriage. We recognize that the state has a strong public policy interest in 
encouraging legal marriage. We do not, however, believe that policy is well 
served by allowing one participant in a meretricious relationship to abscond with 
the bulk of the couple’s acquisitions.”) (citation omitted); Williams v. Ormsby, 
966 N.E.2d 255, 263 (Ohio 2012) (“But palimony is not recognized by Ohio 
statute or common law, and Ohio does not permit a division of assets or property 
based on cohabitation. Our state has steadily retreated from recognizing property 
interests in romantic relationships.”) (citations omitted). 
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and reflection) should consistently reinforce by public choices and 
preferences and not merely allow for responsibilities and 
accountability to be st aside when inconvenient.28 
The consequences of social evolution are reflected in the data. 
In the United States, “[c]ohabitation was rare and stigmatized in the 
1950s; by the turn of the twenty-first century, it had become 
accepted both as a precursor to marriage and as a stand-alone 
relationship.”29 Even as of 1968, “living with an unmarried partner 
was rare. Only 0.1 percent of 18- to 24-year-olds and 0.2 percent of 
25- to 34-year-olds lived with an unmarried partner” which contrasts 
with rising rates of cohabitation, such that “the proportion of young 
adults who are married has declined over time.”30  Today, “30 
percent of young adults ages 18-34 are married, but 40 years ago, in 
1978, 59 percent of young adults were married.”31 If these trends are 
considered in the context of income disparities and marital status as 
it impacts children, policies which forbid or restrict marriage as a 
recognized legal and economic partnership are  even more difficult 
to sustain as harbingers of poverty and economic instability.32 
                                                                                                                                  
28This assertion does not mean all things are acceptable on some scale of moral 
relativism or extreme example intended to generate irrational responses any 
more than failing to protect adults and children from violence or abuse for 
centuries as property or privacy is acceptable today. Whatever the preference, 
social welfare policy should be driven by a clear lens. See JUNE CARBONE & 
NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE 
AMERICAN FAMILY 90 (2014) (“It is time to recognize that family scripts have 
been rewritten, and they have been rewritten along the diverging lines of gender, 
class, and culture. Marriage is thriving among higher-income, well-educated 
men and women who have become more likely to stay together; marriage is 
dying among lower-income, less-educated men and women, and the marriages 
they do enter into are more likely to end in divorce.”). 
29Sarah R. Hayford & S. Philip Morgan, The Quality of Retrospective Data on 
Cohabitation, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 129, 129 (2008). 
30Benjamin Gurrentz, Living with an Unmarried Partner Now Common for 
Young Adults (Nov. 15, 2018), 
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/11/cohabitaiton-is-up-marriage-is-
down-for-young-adults.html. 
31 Id. 
32See Lawrence B. Finer & Mia R. Zolna, Unintended Pregnancy in the United 
States: Incidence and Disparities, 2006, 84 CONTRACEPTION 478, 480 (2011) 
(“Unintended pregnancy rates increased among cohabitors and formerly-married 
women. Cohabiting women exhibited both the highest rate and the greatest 
increase among all individual subgroups measured in this analysis. Rates were 
even higher among cohabiting women who were under 25 years old or poor or 
low-income.”). An additional finding suggests that cohabitation may not be a 
protective or predicative factor for successful marriage. See Wendy D. Manning 
& Jessica A. Cohen, Premarital Cohabitation and Marital Dissolution: An 
Examination of Recent Marriages, 74 J. MARRIAGE FAM. 377, 386 (2012) (“To 
date, no study has found a protective influence of cohabitation on marital 
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For political and organizational scholars, complex iterations of 
social welfare and legal policy are described as “wicked” which may 
be defined generally “as associated with social pluralism (multiple 
interests and values of stakeholders), institutional complexity (the 
context of interorganizational cooperation and multilevel 
governance), and scientific uncertainty (fragmentation and gaps in 
reliable knowledge.” 33 In the arena of marriage and divorce, the 
complex and chaotic blending of data, beliefs, myths, preferences, 
and policies of individuals and groups fits this metaphorical 
framework for analysis: 
[W]icked problems are relentless. The problems are not going 
to be solved once and for all despite all the best intentions and 
resources directed at the problem, and efforts to solve the wicked 
problem will have consequences for other policy arenas as well. 
Similar to a stone dropped in the water, the ripples spread rapidly to 
have an impact on other issue areas.34 
What “wicked” means to marriage policy may begin with what 
Professor Ariela R. Dubler grounds as the argument for the doctrine 
of common law marriage in a per curiam opinion written in 1809 by 
Chancellor Kent for the New York Supreme Court of Judicature.35 
In Fenton v. Reed,36 the Court held a second marriage valid. 
Although their marriage was considered null and void while the 
original husband was alive, “no proof of solemnization after his 
death was needed for their marriage to be valid.”37 Instead, marriage 
may be proved by “cohabitation, reputation, acknowledgment of the 
parties, reception in the family, and other circumstances from which 
a marriage may be inferred or, as stated in more formal Latin terms, 
a contract of marriage made per verba de presenti amounts to an 
                                                                                                                                  
instability. Among subgroups of women facing the greatest risk of divorce, 
being engaged at the start of cohabitation appears to be protective and tied to 
significantly lower odds of marital instability. These findings speak to the 
importance of recognizing socioeconomic variation in the potential role of 
cohabitation in regard to marital quality and stability”). 
33Brian W. Head & John Alford, Wicked Problems: Implications for Public 
Policy and Management, 47 ADMIN. SOC’Y 711, 716 (2013) The literature on 
public administrations is a vast source of case study which would benefit 
stakeholders and policy maker when examining judicial systems and family law 
polices. 
34Edward P. Weber & Anne M. Khademian, Wicked Problems, Knowledge 
Challenges, and Collaborative Capacity Builders in Network Settings, 68 
PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 334, 336-37 (2008). 
35Ariela R. Dubler, Governing Through Contract: Common Law Marriage in the 
Nineteenth Century, 107 YALE L. J. 1885, 1889 (1998). 
36Id. at 1887. 
37Id. at 1885. 
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actual marriage, and is valid as if made in facie ecclesice.”38 Because 
“[t]he parties cohabited together as husband [and] wife, and under 
the reputation and understanding that they were such; and the wife, 
during this time, sustained a good character in society,” then “an 
actual marriage between them could be inferred.”39 
With this opinion, Professor Dubler concluded that  Chancellor 
Kent,”[s]taked out one defining pole of a controversy that was to 
rage in the state courts for the next century” which “with varying 
levels of vitriol, the legitimacy of the doctrine of common law 
marriage” as the doctrine by which courts could (should is another 
wicked policy question) recognize unsolemnized, long-term, sexual 
unions as marriages.40 As applicable to the PSD and DME debates 
even today and discussed below, Professor Dubler reveals that the 
same policy schisms of centuries ago remain the rigid categories for 
debate today: 
To proponents of the doctrine, a group that included a majority 
of state courts by the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a 
common law marriage was a valid contract between a man and a 
woman that demanded judicial enforcement. To opponents of the 
doctrine, by contrast, common law marriages represented the 
desanctification of the sacred marital relationship and the abdication 
of critically needed state control over the most foundational of social 
relationships.41 
For generations now, various state courts have struggled with 
the same inequities and policy principles described by Chancellor 
Kent in 1809. To avoid the consequences of not-a-marriage, parties 
initiated civil actions, labeled in shorthand as “palimony”42 by savvy 
                                                                                                                                  
38Id. at 1885-86 (quoting Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. at 54). 
39Id. at 1886. 
40 Id. 
41Dubler, supra note 35, at 1886 (emphasis added). 
42See Noel Myricks, “Palimony”: The Impact of MARVIN V. MARVIN, 29 FAM. 
RELATIONS 210, 211 (1980) (“It was a term with a Madison Avenue appeal that 
some imaginative writer used to describe the award received by Michelle 
Marvin. In either case, the concept took root in the public mind but not the 
courts.”). See, e.g., Wooldridge v. Wooldridge, 856 So. 2d 446, 453 (Miss. 2003) 
(“Steve and Debra resumed cohabitation approximately one month after their 
divorce, and but for want of obtaining another marriage license, they lived in the 
same relationship in which they had lived from 1973 through 1994, holding 
themselves out to the public as well as their two daughters as having legally 
remarried. While we do not sanction palimony, we do believe in equitable 
distribution consistent with each party’s contribution.”); Maeker v. Ross, 62 
A.3d 310, 316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (“Palimony is a claim for 
support between unmarried persons, which our Supreme Court first recognized 
as a viable cause of action in Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 
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media an marketers, as well as civil equity and tort causes of action 
for constructive trust, partition, fraud, or unjust enrichment43 The 
New York Supreme Court, for example, noted, with seeming 
frustration only a few years ago, that: 
it has previously diagnosed, at length, what it perceives as the 
dangers posed by constructive trust actions based on inferred or 
implied pre-marital promises between couples. Unraveling these 
complex inter-personal transactions risks resurrecting palimony-like 
claims and claims outlawed by the demise of common law marriage 
in New York. The public policy contortions created by the 
confluence of equitable distribution claims under the Domestic 
Relations Law and common law constructive trust claims, if they 
merit reappraisal, must be deconstructed by some higher authority.44 
There are several policy arguments in support of the New York 
court’s reasoning.  Among those responses are that religious and 
cultural beliefs are entitled to respect and protection within the realm 
of state policy and constitutional rights.45 Whether in the form or 
tradition or practice or faith or scripture, religious viewpoints belong 
in the public square as a function of healthy debate and organizing 
                                                                                                                                  
(1979). Because palimony actions are based upon principles of contract, 
plaintiff’s cause of action accrued at the time defendant is alleged to have 
breached the agreement, not at the time the promise of lifetime support was 
purportedly made.”). 
43See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d 834, 860 (Ill. 2016) “As noted in 
Hewitt and the line of cases that follow its holding, unmarried individuals may 
make express or implied contracts with one another, and such contracts will be 
enforceable if they are not based on a relationship indistinguishable from 
marriage.”); Cassidy v. Cassidy, 982 A.2d 326, 328 (Me. 2009) (“A constructive 
trust may be imposed to do equity and to prevent unjust enrichment when title to 
property is acquired by fraud, duress, or undue influence, or is acquired or 
retained in violation of a fiduciary duty.”) (citation omitted); Harman v. Rogers, 
510 A.2d 161, 165 (Vt. 1986) (“In sum, plaintiff’s implied contract claim fails, 
not because of the nature of the parties’ relationship, but because she did not 
sustain her burden of showing a mutual expectation of payment over and above 
her $3 per hour wage.”). 
44Bower v. Bower, 988 N.Y.S.2d 521, 521 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014). 
45See Ann Laquer Estin, Foreign and Religious Family Law: Comity, Contract, 
and the Constitution, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 1029, 1033 (2013) (“Constitutional 
doctrines provide the clearest possible threshold definition of both due process 
and public policy, and provide a useful lens for examining the types of concerns 
that courts might have in deciding these cases. In my view, state courts have 
generally done a good job using comity, contract, and the Constitution to 
manage cases involving foreign and religious family law.”); Joel A. Nichols, 
Religion, Marriage, and Pluralism, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 967, 985 (2011) 
(“There are hard and yet unresolved questions about how a liberal democracy 
like the United States is going to incorporate all its citizens into the polity and 
promote values of liberty, equality, and nondiscrimination while also respecting 
and promoting religious liberty and personal autonomy.”). 
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principles that respect the dignity and worth of every human being.46 
The more liberal viewpoint toward policies related to marriage (or 
divorce for that matter) should not diminish the importance of 
viewpoints grounded in principles that view marriage or not-to-
marry as individual freedoms to choose with known consequences. 
As one scholar pointed out rather persuasively for practitioners, 
“constitutional law has rarely provided a suitable tool for 
understanding family relationships, and that its limitations become 
increasingly transparent as society becomes less and less certain 
about how to evaluate the changing contours of the domestic 
sphere.”47 
Nevertheless, refusing to acknowledge the history of marriage 
and divorce in the United States as it pertained to bias and bigotry 
in conjunction with current demographic realties is unsound policy 
and practice; not anti-religion, neo-conservative, or neo-liberal.48 By 
way of example, there is substantial literature tracing the history of 
common-law marriage but what is always a surprise to some in the 
policy arena is how “new” is often only the re-packaged old.49  The 
rigidity and exclusivity of categories (married or not married) still 
                                                                                                                                  
46See, e.g., Loren Marks, How Does Religion Influence Marriage? Christian, 
Jewish, Mormon, and Muslim Perspectives, 38 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 85, 88 
(2005) (“Several studies link religiosity (including strong religious beliefs) with 
increased marital satisfaction and duration, increased commitment and 
fidelity.”); Margaret L. Vaaler, et al., Religious Influences on the Risk of Marital 
Dissolution, 71 J. OF MARRIAGE AND FAM. 917, 931 (2009) (“In sum, our 
findings demonstrate modest but important influences of multiple dimensions of 
religious involvement on the risk of marital dissolution.”). 
47Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 337, 339 (2002). 
48These labels are fluid and change from generation to generation. The literature 
is vast, but see, for example, Milan Zafirovski, LIBERAL MODERNITY AND ITS 
ADVERSARIES: FREEDOM, LIBERALISM AND ANTI-LIBERALISM IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY (2007). 
49See, e.g., Jennifer Thomas, Common Law Marriage, 22 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 151, 156 (2009) (“The doctrine of common law marriage 
was adopted in state courts for several reasons. The first and probably most 
important rationale for the adoption of common law marriage was the belief that 
marriage derived from a natural right that every human possessed. Marriage is a 
civil contract between two people that should not be disrupted unless there is a 
statute specifically stating the common law marriages are invalid.”); Meister v. 
Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 80-81 (1877) (“State marriage regulations requiring a license 
and ceremony are not mandatory, but rather directory, because marriage is a 
common right, because a ‘statute may declare that no marriages shall be valid 
unless they are solemnized in a prescribed manner; but such an enactment is a 
very different thing from a law requiring all marriages to be entered into in the 
presence of a magistrate or a clergyman, or that it be preceded by a license, or 
publication of banns, or be attested by witnesses.”). 
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matters today as a matter of policy because not having the status of 
married may mean no equitable distribution and spousal support for 
an economically disadvantaged spouse but married may mean 
access to economic rights, including those judicially-enforced 
rights, as well as social security and private pensions.50 For example, 
a common enough fact pattern is, as follows: 
H and W move in together and, over the next 15 years, 
cohabitate and have 3 children. A few years into the relationship, 
they get “engaged” and W wears an engagement ring. They refer to 
themselves as “fiancés” and enroll their children in school as a 
married couple, obtain health insurance, and buy a house, cars, and 
use credit cards. When they separate, they file a parental rights 
action but no action for distribution of marital property acquired 
during the relationship or spousal support.51 
In a common law marriage, however, a state, on that fact 
pattern, may recognize as did the Chancellor in 1809, that the 
circumstances of the relationship (cohabitation, coition, and 
children, for example) may create a legally binding marriage 
(contract or license) even without intent expressed by a public 
                                                                                                                                  
50See, e.g., Chaves v. Chaves, 84 So. 672, 675 (Fla. 1920) (“‘The only 
foundation for an order for alimony, suit money and counsel fees pendente lite is 
the fact of marriage between the parties.’“); Davis v. Misiano, 366 N.E.2d 752, 
753 (Mass. 1977) (nonmarital partners have no right to separate support and 
alimony). 
51See, e.g., Cerovic v. Stojkov, 134 A.3d 766, 774-75 (D.C. 2016) (“It is well 
established that a party claiming that a common law marriage exists must prove 
the existence of that common law marriage by a preponderance of the evidence. 
It is similarly settled that where two marriages are at issue, there is a 
presumption that the later marriage is the valid one.”); Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 
171, 176 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (“In 1987, the Legislature adopted section 30-1-
4.5 of the Utah Code to provide a mechanism by which the state will recognize a 
relationship as a marriage although there was no solemnization. This is 
commonly referred to as a common law marriage.”) (citation omitted); 
Mueggenborg v. Walling, 836 P.2d 112, 113 (Okla. 1992) (“A common-law 
marriage requires competent parties, who enter the relationship by mutual 
agreement, exclusive of all others, consummating arrangement [sic] by 
cohabitation and open assumption of marital duties, and such relationship must 
be established by evidence that is clear and convincing.”); Luis v. Gaugler, 185 
A.3d 497, 503 (R.I. 2018) (“However, because common-law marriage remains 
the law in Rhode Island, to prove it ‘we have adopted the clear and convincing 
standard of proof.’ ‘The existence of a common-law marriage vel non is 
intrinsically a fact-intensive inquiry.’ The required showings are that (1) the 
parties had the capacity to marry; (2) the parties seriously intended to enter into 
a mutual husband-wife relationship; and (3) the parties’ conduct was of such a 
character so as to lead to a belief in the community that they were married.’”) 
(citations and footnote omitted). 
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ceremony ( an aspect of the equitable doctrines described below).52 
Unlike PSD or DME, a common-law marriage “does not depend for 
its validity upon any religious or civil ceremony but is created by 
the consent of the parties as any other contract.”53 The policy 
reasons were multi-faceted: “(1) marriage was considered a natural 
right granted to every person; (2) marriage was favored over illicit 
relationships; (3) children born out of wedlock were considered 
illegitimate and, therefore, did not enjoy certain legal protections; 
and (4) concern that women would become economically dependent 
upon the state.” 54 If these principles have value then denying others 
such a “natural right” to be married, as argued for in common law 
marriage, is poor social and legal policy.55 Conversely, recognition 
of common law marriage, like the equitable doctrines discussed 
below, supports policies which enforce accountability and stability 
for spouses and children.56 
                                                                                                                                  
52Prior to its abolition [January 1, 2005], “[a] common-law marriage [could] 
only [have been] created by an exchange of words in the present tense, spoken 
with the specific purpose that the legal relationship of husband and wife is 
created by such exchange.” Bell v. Ferraro, 849 A.2d 1233, 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2004). 
53Luis v. Gaugler, 185 A.3d 497, 502-03 (R.I. 2018) (quoting OTTO E. KOEGEL, 
COMMON LAW MARRIAGE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 7 
(1922)). The doctrine “expanded to Western America in the nineteenth century 
due to the lack of religious officials to perform marriage ceremonies and the 
difficulty of traveling.” Id. at 503 (quoting Jennifer Thomas, Common Law 
Marriage, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 151, 156-57 (2009)). 
54 Id. 
55The debate concerning natural rights has a long history beyond the scope of 
this article. What is important to note is that use of the language “natural rights” 
has its counter use against expanding civil law to some groups or expanding 
autonomy to others. See Shannon Holder, Natural law, Natural Rights, and 
Same-Sex Civil Marriage: Do Same-Sex Couples Have a Natural Right to be 
Married, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 63, 71 (2014) (“What if, apart from the sexual 
act, there is a natural right to same-sex civil marriage because of the nature of 
marriage itself? If there is a natural right to same-sex civil marriage, then there 
is an implicit obligation that is placed upon citizens to accept such unions as 
legitimate. If, however, there is no natural right to same-sex civil marriage, then 
there is no obligation for citizens to treat same-sex civil marriage as true 
marriage.”); Michael Anthony Lawrence, Reviving a Natural Right: The 
Freedom of Autonomy, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 123, 185 (2006) (“If the 
freedom of autonomy is to be revived from its current slumber in modem-day 
America, Americans must develop a greater understanding of the nature and rich 
history of this most basic natural right.”). 
56Although this argument is sometimes classified as conservative in terms of a 
preference for fault-based divorce, for example, the argument is actually 
premised on the liberal view of freedom of choice but with consequences which 
society finds more important and valuable, such as financial support and 
stability for spouses and children. See Margaret F. Brinig & Frank H. Buckley, 
No-Fault Laws and At-Fault People, 18 INTERNAT. REV. OF L. AND ECON. 325, 
2020] Putative Spouse and Marriage by Estoppel Doctrines 67 
 
III. THE BELIVEAU V. WHALEN APPROACH TO 
NOT-A-MARRIAGE 
 
Belliveau appealed from a family court order dismissing his 
complaint for divorce after the trial court found that the parties were 
never legally married.57 The facts as reported by the court are 
summarized here. In May of 1992, Belliveau and Whelan traveled 
to England to be married.58 Upon arriving they attempted to obtain 
a marriage license from the local town hall but were denied a license 
because they did not meet the residency requirement.59 Despite this, 
Belliveau and Whelan went ahead with their planned wedding 
ceremony, which was officiated by a friend who was neither a 
minister nor an official authorized to solemnize marriages there.60 
Upon their return to Maine, they held a “wedding reception,” but did 
not seek or obtain a marriage license in Maine, nor did they take any 
other steps to create a valid marriage.61 
Over the next twenty-six years, Belliveau and Whelan held 
themselves out to others as only a married couple.62 Belliveau and 
Whelan filed joint income taxes, signed medical insurance 
documents as a married couple, and signed and had notarized a 
“Property Ownership Agreement” that characterizes them as 
“husband and wife.”63 This agreement indicates that, in the event of 
                                                                                                                                  
326 (1998) (“Our results suggest a policy response to increased divorce levels. 
Social conservatives argue persuasively that increased divorce levels have 
harmed women and children and coarsened civil society.”). In states, a party 
may raise “condonation” as an affirmative defense to adultery as a fault-based 
justification for divorce. This point matters because condonation is an example 
of how the common law found that prospective behavior may trump past 
behavior with consequences-but no do-over-later. See Schneider v. Richardson, 
438 A.2d 896, 897 (Me. 1981) (“Condonation means a blotting out of the 
offense imputed so as to restore the offending party to the same position he or 
she occupied before the offense was committed. If the evidence is undisputed 
the question is one of law. Condonation occurs when the injured spouse, with 
knowledge of the conduct, undertakes expressly or impliedly to overlook and 
forgive the wrongs and restores the other spouse unconditionally to the 
enjoyment of all marital rights.”) (citations omitted). See generally Timothy B. 
Walker, Disarming the Litigious Man: A Glance at Fault and California’s New 
Divorce Legislation, 1 PAC. L.J. 182 (1970). 
57Belliveau v. Whalen, 213 A.3d 617 (Me. 2019). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63Id. at 617-18. 
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a divorce, Whelan would retain exclusive ownership of the 
property.64 In March 2017, Belliveau filed a complaint for divorce.65 
In response, Whelan asserted that the parties were never legally 
married and sought dismissal.66 After holding an interim hearing, 
the court agreed with Whelan and dismissed the complaint.67 
In a short and unanimous decision, the court noted that 
requirements for a valid marriage are statutory and that the court has 
historically declined to recognize common law marriage but 
“continuously left policy decisions regarding marriage and divorce 
to the Legislature.”68 The court found that there “is no dispute that 
Belliveau and Whelan did not comply with the statutory 
requirements to enter into a valid marriage.”69 Nevertheless, 
Belliveau “asks us to create an end-run around those requirements 
by adopting one, or both, of two equitable doctrines—the putative 
spouse doctrine or the doctrine of marriage by estoppel.”70 The court 
declined to do so because “the adoption of either of these doctrines 
by us would be an infringement on the Legislature’s function and 
would only introduce new uncertainties into our law.”71 In a 
footnote,  the court recognized that in some states, the legislature 
has adopted the putative spouse doctrine, or some version of it, by 
statute.72 In other states, “courts have judicially adopted one or both 
of the doctrines.73 Yet, in “other states, courts have declined to adopt 
the doctrine in deference to the legislature’s policy-making 
function.”74 
What may be puzzling about the exercise of judicial restraint 
here, and on these facts, is that the preference for a valid marriage, 
                                                                                                                                  
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67Id. at 618. 
68Id. (citing Pierce v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 254 A.2d 
46, 47 (Me. 1969) (“Sound public policy dictates that there be a minimum of 
uncertainty as to whether or not a [valid] marriage exists.”). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71Id. (quoting Grishman v. Grishman, 407 A.2d 9, 12 (Me. 1979)). 
72Id. at 618 n. 1. 
73Id.; see Williams v. Williams, 97 P.3d 1124, 1128-29 (Nev. 2004); Xiong v. 
Xiong, 648 N.W.2d 900, 905-06 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002); Martin v. Coleman, 19 
S.W.3d 757, 760-61 (Tenn. 2000); Lowenschuss v Lowenschuss, 579 A.2d 377, 
381-82, 386 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Chrismond v. Chrismond, 52 So. 2d 624, 
628-29 (Miss. 1951). 
74Id.; see Hill v. Bell, 747 S.E.2d 791, 791-93 (S.C. 2013); Watts v. Watts, 405 
N.W.2d 303, 309 (Wis. 1987); Goldin v. Goldin, 426 A.2d 410, 412-13 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1981). 
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and its importance to society and family, appears to depend upon 
whether marital status is deemed unworthy—historically and 
politically-by race or poverty or sexual orientation as described by 
case law for generations.75 State supreme courts have the last word 
(again absent some federal constitutional issue not present) relative 
to defining matters of marriage and divorce; as a function of 
constitutional separation of powers (legislative prerogatives)—even 
when not overtly mentioned—and courts may also exercise comity 
by avoiding ancient principles equity to prevent misfeasance or 
malfeasance.76  The same-sex marriage debate is an example of a 
confluence of social factors and political authority merging with 
private and public acceptance and support for the right to marry by 
choice not excusive categories of status alone.77  If so, what may 
matter is that Belliveau himself was not part of a class entitled to 
constitutional protection but if he and this publicly-acknowledged 
“wife” and “husband” had been subject to such constitutional 
protection, the result may have been different. 
                                                                                                                                  
75See discussion supra notes 1-16. Almost a century and a half before Belliveau 
was decided the Court decided another case. See Carter v. Parker, 28 Me. 509, 
509 (1848) (“The marriage of the demandant with Jonathan Carter, was denied. 
A witness testified, that he had known her more than sixty years, that she lived 
during that period and until his death with Jonathan Carter as his wife, that they 
had and reared a numerous family of children; that he knew her at Concord, N. 
H. where it was said, she was published and married. In the absence of any 
testimony tending to rebut it, this testimony would authorize the conclusion, that 
they were legally married.”). 
76See Dana E. Prescott, Consent Decrees, the Enlightenment, and the Modern 
Social Contract: A Case Study from Bates, Olmstead, and Maine’s Separation of 
Powers Doctrine, 59 ME. L. REV 75, 110 (2007) (“Thus, a doctrine of separation 
of powers may be formulated from the premise that it is essential for the 
establishment and maintenance of political harmony that government be divided 
into identifiable, functional (or functionalist) parts. In this sense, the 
Constitution reflects the law’s boundedness as it is part inspirational and part 
procedural.”); Jennifer Wriggins, Maine’s Act to Protect Traditional Marriage 
and Prohibit Same-Sex Marriages: Questions of Constitutionality Under State 
and Federal Law, 50 ME. L. REV. 345, 348 (1998) (“Civil marriage in Maine and 
other states is regulated by state statute, and marriage regulation is generally 
considered to be within the state’s police power. However, the state’s power to 
regulate marriage is subject to constitutional limitations.”). 
77As anyone familiar with slavery, the Old or New Jim Crow, and other 
mutations of racism understands, certain groups are rather creative at hiding 
beliefs or adapting language to the historical and political moment. See Darlene 
C. Goring, Premature Celebration: OBERGEFELL Offers Little Immigration 
Relief to Binational Same-Sex Couples, 59 HOW. L.J. 305 (2015); Ira C. Lupu, 
Moving Targets: OBERGEFELL, HOBBY LOBBY, and the Future of LGBT Rights, 
7 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 1 (2015); Leeford Tritt, Moving Forward by Looking 
Back: The Retroactive Application of OBERGEFELL, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 873. 
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It may also be the case that the court was concerned that 
uncertainty in the law is a prescription for avoiding judicial adoption 
of such a doctrine.78 A review of these rather unique facts likely 
leaves these parties as a class of one. And state supreme courts such 
as Virginia,79 as described below, have prospectively applied the 
scope of holdings for centuries to new fact patterns without much 
difficulty and, in later cases, affirmed, expanded, or distinguished 
common law, contract, or equitable doctrines related to marriage.80 
Nothing novel there since the inception of this constitutional 
republic at the federal and state levels. What may have mattered as 
a matter of equity jurisprudence, but did not, is that such a decision 
left a child without married parents, divested a spouse of rights to 
federal and state benefits, and gave imprimatur to the benefits from 
inaccurately filed federal and state tax returns, among other under 
oath statements that they were legally married for decades.  81 
                                                                                                                                  
78See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 643 So.2d 931, 934-35 (Miss. 1994) (“We are of the 
opinion that public policy questions of such magnitude are best left to the 
legislative process, which is better equipped to resolve the questions which 
inevitably will arise as unmarried cohabitation becomes an established feature of 
our society. While the judicial branch is not without power to fashion remedies 
in this area, we are unwilling to extend equitable principles to the extent plaintiff 
would have us to do, since recovery based on principles of contracts implied in 
law essentially would resurrect the old common-law marriage doctrine which 
was specifically abolished by the Legislature.”). 
79See infra Part IV. 
80See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d 834, 851 (Ill. 2016) (“As explained 
supra, our decision in Hewitt did no more than follow the statutory provision 
abolishing common-law marriage, which embodied the public policy of Illinois 
that individuals acting privately by themselves, without the involvement of the 
State, cannot create marriage-like benefits. Hewitt clearly declared the law on 
the very issue in this case. Yet, the appellate court in this case declined to follow 
our ruling, despite the facts being almost identical to Hewitt. This was improper. 
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, when this court ‘has declared the law on any 
point, it alone can overrule and modify its previous opinion, and the lower 
judicial tribunals are bound by such decision and it is the duty of such lower 
tribunals to follow such decision in similar cases.’); Van v. Zahorik, 597 
N.W.2d 15, 21 (Mich. 1999) (“The present matter may be distinguished from the 
cited cases on the basis that here the parties were never married to each other. 
However, this is a distinction without a difference with respect to the elements 
of equitable estoppel. The cited cases emphasized the length of time during 
which the putative father held himself out as a father rather than the existence of 
a marriage relationship in finding estoppel.”). 
81As in many states, equitable estoppel can apply against private parties and 
even the government. See John F. Murphy Homes, Inc. v. State, 158 A.3d 921, 
927 (Me. 2017) (“To prevail on an equitable estoppel claim against a 
government entity, the proponent of the claim must demonstrate by ‘clear and 
satisfactory’ evidence that (1) the statements or conduct of a governmental 
official or agency induced the party to act, or here, to fail to act; (2) the reliance 
was detrimental to the party; and (3) the reliance was reasonable.”); Kamp v. 
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IV. EQUITABLE DOCTRINES OF MARRIAGE 
 
A. PUTATIVE SPOUSE DOCTRINE 
 
In Williams v. Williams,82 the Nevada Supreme Court, in an 
annulment case, succinctly outlined PSD, as follows: 
Under the putative spouse doctrine, when a marriage is legally 
void, the civil effects of a legal marriage flow to the parties who 
contracted to marry in good faith. That is, a putative spouse is 
entitled to many of the rights of an actual spouse. A majority of 
states have recognized some form of the doctrine through case law 
or statute. States differ, however, on what exactly constitutes a “civil 
effect.” The doctrine was developed to avoid depriving innocent 
parties who believe in good faith that they are married from being 
denied the economic and status-related benefits of marriage, such 
as property division, pension, and health benefits. 
The doctrine has two elements: (1) a proper marriage 
ceremony was performed, and (2) one or both of the parties had a 
good-faith belief that there was no impediment to the marriage and 
the marriage was valid and proper. “Good faith” has been defined 
as an “honest and reasonable belief that the marriage was valid at 
the time of the ceremony.” Good faith is presumed. The party 
asserting lack of good faith has the burden of proving bad faith. 
Whether the party acted in good faith is a question of fact. 
Unconfirmed rumors or mere suspicions of a legal impediment do 
not vitiate good faith “‘so long as no certain or authoritative 
knowledge of some legal impediment comes to him or her.’“ 
However, when a person receives reliable information that an 
impediment exists, the individual cannot ignore the information, but 
instead has a duty to investigate further. Persons cannot act “‘blindly 
or without reasonable precaution.’“ Finally, once a spouse learns of 
the impediment, the putative marriage ends.83 
                                                                                                                                  
Department of Human Services, 980 A.2d 448, 465 (Md. 2009) (“Equitable 
estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is 
absolutely precluded both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which 
might perhaps have otherwise existed, either of property, of contract, or of 
remedy, as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such 
conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse and who 
on his part acquires some corresponding right, either of property, of contract, or 
of remedy.) (citation omitted). 
8297 P.3d 1124 (Nev. 2004). 
83Id. at 1128 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added). 
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This doctrine is distinguished from common law marriage by 
virtue of elements of a “proper marriage ceremony” and that one or 
both (in this case both) parties had a good faith belief that they had 
a valid marriage” for decades.84 
In several cases related to pension rights, death benefits, or tort 
actions, for example, courts have been unwilling to expand the 
doctrine when there is a valid first marriage. In Hill v. Bell,85 for 
example, the South Carolina Supreme Court declined to adopt the 
putative spouse doctrine at least in the context of a second 
relationship and while a spouse was still legally married. The Court 
held that statute and precedent was contrary to South Carolina’s 
statutory law and marital jurisprudence.86 In Ferry v. De Longhi 
America Inc.,87 the federal district court addressed the doctrine in the 
context of a wrongful death suit. Applying California law, the Court 
reasoned that the putative spouse doctrine protects “innocent parties 
who believe they were validly married.”88 The question is whether a 
reasonable person could harbor a good faith belief in the existence 
of a lawful marriage because courts may “whether efforts were made 
to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the 
infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.”89 Nevertheless, 
the federal court was unwilling to expand the doctrine to allow the 
plaintiff to recover in a tort action.90 
As one author reasoned, the “putative marriage rule provides 
the proverbial bridge to civil effects in the event parties fail in their 
attempt to contract a valid marriage, believing in good faith they had 
                                                                                                                                  
84As is common enough in family law, courts have recognized that retrospective 
changes in intent are not dispositive or credible absent some other form of 
evidence. See Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018, 1021 n.3 (Me. 1980) 
(“Motivation for the gift is irrelevant. In any event, retrospective statements of 
intention offered at the time of divorce to defeat the other spouse’s interest are 
highly suspect.”) (partially overruled on other grounds). 
85747 S.E.2d 791 (S.C. 2013). 
86See id. at 792 (“All marriages contracted while either of the parties has a 
former wife or husband living shall be void.”). 
87276 F.Supp.3d 940 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
88Id. at 951. 
89Id. at 952 (citations omitted). 
90The history of federalism and the application of state law in federal courts is 
fascinating but beyond the scope of this article. Federal courts, however, have 
restrictions when applying substantive state laws whether in tort or marriage. See 
Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 1237, 1239 (2010) (“The obligations of a state court when 
interpreting sister-state law go to the heart of what it means to have fifty states 
cohabiting a federal union. The vertical analogue—namely, a federal court’s 
obligations when interpreting state law—has been given plenty of judicial and 
academic scrutiny.”). 
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done so” and has been described as “ameliorative or corrective,” to 
give “innocent spouses to a legally null marriage the civil effects to 
which parties in a valid marriage enjoy.”91 In other words, and as 
suggested by Williams and similar cases,92 “if one or both of the 
parties celebrate a marriage, believing it to be properly contracted in 
form and in substance, but some legal impediment plagues its 
validity, the putative marriage rule would allow the good faith party 
or parties to the marriage to enjoy the civil effects of valid marriage, 
notwithstanding its invalidity.”93 As decided in Beliveau, however, 
conventional forms of equitable relief are not universally adopted to 
a spouse and co-parent as compared with a contractor or 
shareholder.94 
 
B. MARRIAGE BY ESTOPPEL 
 
The doctrine of marriage by estoppel is the standard application 
of ancient estoppel principles of equity. Cases may arise when a 
spouse seeks to argue that a prior divorce was invalid such that the 
current marriage must be void. In Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss,95  
for example, the court was “completely unpersuaded by husband’s 
protestations concerning his conduct after 1974 when he allegedly 
first discovered that wife’s divorce was invalid. It is of no 
significance that husband then privately considered himself 
unmarried and told wife that he did.”96 For nine years, much less 
than the 26 years in Beliveau, Husband conducted himself as a 
married man and he and his wife continued to raise their children 
together with the only change afterward being that the husband filed 
his tax returns separately.97 
As the court reasoned, whatever husband may have thought 
about his marital status, or whatever he may have told wife about 
their marital status, none of this alters the fact that the parties both 
continued to live as husband and wife and “continued to conduct 
themselves as if there was no impediment to their marriage.”98 
Husband cannot now contradict his course of conduct and most 
                                                                                                                                  
91Monica Hof Wallace, The Pitfalls of a Putative Marriage and the Call for a 
Putative Divorce, 64 LA. L. REV. 71, 73 (2003). 
92See supra note 73. 
93 Id. 
94See discussion supra at notes 68-74. 
95579 A.2d 377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
96Id. at 385. 
97 Id. 
98Id. at 386. 
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importantly, as the court bluntly asserted, possess the unilateral 
“right to decide when the parties are to be considered married and 
when they are not, depending on what suits his personal or 
economic interest.”99 As the court summarized Pennsylvania law 
and its public policy toward family and marriage: 
No social purpose will be served by a decision that this 
marriage simply does not exist and that wife is still the legal wife of 
her first husband and that her four children were born of an illicit 
relationship. To hold that husband may now raise this challenge 
simply in order to avoid the financial obligations of his marriage 
would be grossly inequitable. Such a decision would contravene the 
strongly entrenched policy of this Commonwealth favoring 
preservation of the family unit. Moreover, a decision which would 
allow husband to avoid his marital obligations at this late juncture 
would be completely inconsistent with the Commonwealth’s 
contemporary attitude toward divorce, which is grounded in the 
application of equitable principles to achieve economic justice and 
overall fairness between the parties.100 
In a more recent decision, the Virginia Supreme Court in 
MacDougall v. Levick,101 in a closely decided four to three division, 
vacated a decision of the Virginia Court of Appeals denying the 
application of equitable estoppel to these facts. In this case, the 
parties participated in a wedding ceremony in their home in the 
presence of friends and family in 2002.102 Before the ceremony, the 
officiating rabbi discovered that the parties had not yet obtained a 
marriage license.103 The rabbi suggested that they participate in the 
ceremony that day as long as they obtained a marriage license and 
submitted the marriage certificate to the rabbi as soon as possible.104 
MacDougall went to the courthouse with Levick to obtain the 
                                                                                                                                  
99Id. (emphasis added). 
100Id. (citations omitted); see also Heuer v. Heuer, 704 A.2d 913, 919 (N.J. 
1998) (“Defendant’s assertion that his marriage to plaintiff is invalid is totally 
inconsistent with cohabiting together as husband and wife for an extended 
period. He seeks to injure plaintiff by depriving her of alimony and equitable 
distribution under the statutory scheme set forth at N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. As the 
Court observed in Newburgh, “[u]nder certain circumstances, one who enters 
into and accepts the benefits of a marriage may be equitably estopped” from 
later denying its validity. This is a case in which quasi-estoppel applies, and it 
does not require proof that defendant somehow participated in the Alabama 
proceedings.”) (citation omitted). 
101805 S.E. 2d 776 (Va. 2017). 
102Id. at 776. 
103Id. 
104Id. 
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license and told MacDougall that he would mail the marriage 
register out right away to the rabbi, and she agreed and kissed him 
goodbye.105 As the rabbi testified, he was “completing” the 
solemnization that began with the ceremony and that his receipt of 
the marriage register in the mail demonstrated the couples “intention 
to complete the ceremony.”106 Levick testified that he understood 
that they “needed a license and it had to be signed by the rabbi” and 
that “it was necessary to do [so] in order to be lawfully married.”107 
In 2009, the marriage began to deteriorate so the couple  
entered into a “marital agreement” to “form the foundation of a 
divorce or separation agreement, should either come to pass.”108  
During a divorce proceeding years later, however, Levick asserted 
for the first time that their marriage was void ab initio such that he 
could repudiate a marital agreement requiring him to pay spousal 
support and to distribute marital assets. The trial court agreed with 
Levicks reasoning. The Court of Appeals agreed only in part, 
holding that the marriage was merely voidable, not void ab initio. 
The Virginia Supreme Court held that, “We disagree entirely with 
Levicks reasoning and hold that the marriage was not voidable or 
void ab initio. The circuit court, therefore, had authority to distribute 
the marital assets consistent with the marital agreement and to 
continue its adjudication of the divorce proceeding.”109 While the 
majority “admired the brevity of Levick’s reasoning, it illustrated to 
the majority the aphorism, often attributed to Albert Einstein, that 
‘[e]verything should be made as simple as possible, but not 
simpler.’”110 
The analysis was grounded on a core premise of Virginia law 
governing marriages: “The public policy of Virginia has been to 
uphold the validity of the marriage status as for the best interest of 
                                                                                                                                  
105Id. 
106Id. 
107Id. (emphasis in original). 
108Id. 
109Id. at 776-77. Since Maine became a state in 1820 and drew its earliest 
interpretation of laws from Massachusetts, there was a distinction, as in many 
states, between voidable or void ab initio. See Inhabitants of Hiram v. Pierce, 45 
Me. 367, 372-73 (Me. 1858) (“By the law of Massachusetts, ‘all marriages 
contracted while either of the parties has a former wife or husband living, shall 
be void.’ If this were the only provision, all such marriages would be void, ab 
initio. But, by the statute already cited, all such marriages are excepted from 
prohibition, when contracted in good faith, after a desertion and absence of the 
former husband or wife for the space of seven years. And, by another provision, 
all such marriages may be annulled.”). 
110Id. at 778 (quoting THE ULTIMATE QUOTABLE EINSTEIN 475 (ALICE 
CALAPRICE ED., 2011)). 
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society,” and, thus, the presumption of the validity of a marriage 
ranks as “one of the strongest presumptions known to the law.”111 
As the court reasoned, it “will be readily conceded that English and 
American tribunals tend, in construing the marriage acts, to uphold 
every marriage, if possible, notwithstanding a non-compliance with 
the literal forms.”112 In “our opinion, this robust presumption 
withstands all of Levick’s arguments against it.”113 
Indeed, and as noted by the majority, the dissents’ void-ab-
initio theory, much like the decision in Beliveau, would be 
particularly harsh to MacDougall. After the parties married, she left 
a successful career to become an uncompensated chief operating 
officer for Levicks business and, during her marriage, made 
$380,000 in personal loans to the business which then “served as the 
principal reasons for the monetary and property-distribution 
provisions in the marital agreement.”114 The dissents view, however, 
would “treat her multi-year investment over the course of her 
marriage as irrelevant.”115 The majority wrote that in taking the 
void-ab-initio path, the dissent overlooked the significant hardships 
its reasoning would cause to others as well: 
Creditors of one spouse could seek to strip a couple of the 
protection of a tenancy by the entirety through a challenge to the 
validity of the marriage, even when the couple is happily married 
and wants to remain so. Every legal benefit afforded to lawfully 
married couples—such as joint-filing status for federal and state 
income tax filings; rights under wills, trusts, and other estate-
planning instruments; beneficiary status in retirement and insurance 
policies; and a variety of similar benefits that presuppose the 
existence of a lawful marriage—could be retroactively challenged 
and expose both parties to the allegedly invalid marriage to a host of 
unforeseeable financial consequences.116 
The differences in gender between the two voided-out spouses 
may not be a coincidence and not relevant to the outcome of each of 
the cases discussed. In either case, the dissent in Levick mirrored the 
decision of the Court in Beliveau and rejected the equitable estoppel 
argument. Notably, “such an equitable estoppel argument raises a 
number of significant public policy questions” when parties have 
                                                                                                                                  
111Id. (citations omitted). 
112Id. (citation omitted). 
113Id. 
114Id. at 784. 
115Id. 
116Id. 
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admittedly failed to meet the statutory requirements because “such 
a radical departure from established law is a matter for the 
legislature, not the judiciary.”117 These policy tensions are reflected 
in a body of cases winding between a preference for the strictures of 
marriage law as immutable and equitable recourse as available to 
enforce other policy considerations such as the efficacy of marriage 
and unfair advantage of an intimate partner and parent. 
As the Florida Supreme Court wrote plainly a century ago, the 
essential elements of common law marriage are: “(1) mutual 
consent, and (2) capacity. It is the agreement itself, and not the form 
in which it is couched, which constitutes the contract, and the words 
used or the ceremony performed are, like cohabitation and repute, 
merely evidence of marriage.”118 Similarly, the putative spouse and 
marriage by estoppel doctrines may not meet the rudiments of 
statutory strictures but the critical elements of a legal marriage are 
present: public intent, public ceremony, and public behavior upon 
which there is reliance and benefit conferred by society and 
relationship. If there is an intent to being married and modern 
society believes marriage is critical to economically and legally 
protecting spouses, children, and community there should not be 
barriers to the adult choice of being married irrespective of any 
demographics possessed by of the voided spouse. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In 1961, an author argued that common law divorce may 
suggest a “reasonable hypothesis that informality in contracting 
marriage engenders informality in terminating marriage; that parties 
naturally may assume that if they could ‘do it themselves’ in 
entering into marriage, then ‘do it yourself’ was permissible and 
legal for ending the relationship.”119 The long and divisive doling 
                                                                                                                                  
117Id. at 796 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
118Chaves v. Chaves, 84 So. 672,676 (Fla. 1920). For a critical analysis, see John 
B. Crawley, Is the Honeymoon Over for Common-Law Marriage: A 
Consideration of the Continued Viability of the Common-Law Marriage 
Doctrine, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 399 (1998). 
 
119Henry H. Foster Jr, Common Law Divorce, 46 MINN. L. REV. 43, 62 (1961). 
One of struggles when teaching or writing these days is to give historical context 
to behaviors and polices which are overtly offensive and still explain that 
explicit change in law does not mean an equivalent implicit change in practice. 
The “fact remains, however, that our law of marriage and divorce for the most 
part has devolved from the canon law of churchmen rather than lawyers. That is 
an important historical fact because law as a craft inculcates the art of 
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out of the right to be legally marriage has, at various times, been 
used as a cudgel or form of social control to define “who is worthy” 
in American society and, thereby, excluded certain groups from 
social welfare benefits, economic mobility, and equitable access to 
systems like courts or agencies.120 If the legal status of marriage is a 
tangible preference or choice ,121  and a person acts like there is a 
marriage and accepts the legal, societal, and economic benefits of 
that status, and no other public policy is violated (duress, fraud, 
minority or disability), then is rejection of these equitable doctrines 
premised much more on “who is worthy” than principles  of equity 
and policy beyond mere rhetoric? 
The search by legal scholars to find and impose an empirical 
and rule-based system for judicial decision-making is many 
generations old. It may be re-packaged from time-to-time but the 
polar arguments between law as organic and socially based and 
changing to rigid and predictable is hardly novel. 122 In this sense, 
the right to state approval of a marriage may be viewed through 
various lenses of ideology or unworthiness but, inevitably, 
submerges, historical elements of privilege and bias. For scholars 
tracing common law marriage there is a connection to Loving in that 
strange way that bigotry and racism, like a public health disease, 
adapts from one generation to the next. Until recently, at least in 
                                                                                                                                  
compromise whereas theology unrealistically may insist upon maintaining 
dogma at all cost.” Id. at 63. 
120This is a painful historical topic, but it does analogously link with the history 
of marriage in the United States, along with many other aspects of social justice. 
See Thomas C. Leonard, “More Merciful and Not Less Effective”: Eugenics and 
American Economics in the Progressive Era, 35 HIST. OF POL. ECON. 687, 704 
(2003) (“Biological fitness determines who is worthy and thereby entitled to 
social justice, and who is unworthy, and thereby entitled to social control. 
Groups deemed eugenically unfit—immigrants, blacks, those defective in 
character and intellect—are treated not as victims, but as threats to the health 
and well-being of the worthy poor and of society at large.”). 
121See J. Herbie DiFonzo, How Marriage Became Optional: Cohabitation, 
Gender, and the Emerging Functional Norms, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
521, 540 (2010) (“Marriage is in decline, but cohabitation rates are soaring. 
Defined as a man and woman living together in a nonmarital sexual relationship, 
cohabitation rivals marriage as a means to create a family. It has not, however, 
dislodged the ideal of marriage in the public mind.”). 
122See Jerome Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidean Legal Thinking, 17 
CORNELL L.Q. 568, 571 (1931) (“[T]raditional jurisprudence is founded upon the 
erroneous notion-sometimes expressed but more often implicit-that there are 
self-evident truths about the judicial process which must not and cannot be 
questioned, from which self-evident truths a legal system can be worked out 
logically as the ancient geometers had worked out their system from self-evident 
geometrical axioms.”). 
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historical terms, marriage was thus historically framed as a bundle 
of obligations to society, not a package of rights between individuals 
owed protection by society.123 
There are a couple of other salient historical and policy points 
that guided (and should still guide) a discussion of equitable 
doctrines like PSD and DME. First, there is a tendency to forget that 
a child born outside wedlock was once derogatorily labeled, 
ostracized, and lost rights to inheritance and parentage.124 Although 
that era has seemingly passed because open derogation is offensive 
at least among some portions of American society, it is still a reality 
that a child born of a marriage and then divested of that status is now 
a child born-out-of-wedlock. Perhaps that does not matter anymore 
but much policy has historically derived from a preference to value 
the status of marriage for children because research suggests the 
differences and advantaged across lifespans.125 
Second, women without marital status in centuries past were 
subject to stigma, violence, isolation, and shunning so marriage was 
a preference for safety and survival.126 The Beliveau case, however, 
involved a stay-at-home father and a professional wife who escaped 
spousal support and equitable distribution despite decades of 
marriage. This decision may well reflect the limits of equitable 
                                                                                                                                  
123For this discussion, see Dubler, supra note 35, at 1898. 
124There are many books and articles on the policy and history as it pertains to 
restrictions on the rights of children. See Dubler, supra note 35, at 1902 
(“Opponents of common law marriage recognized the strength of their judicial 
adversaries’ argument that the doctrine was needed to avoid rendering 
illegitimate the offspring of many unsolemnized unions. Nevertheless, they 
argued that the need to protect society outweighed the need to legitimate even 
innocent children. As George Elliot Howard, a leading opponent of common law 
marriage, argued in his history of marriage: ‘Far better that the children of a 
delinquent minority should bear the stain of illegitimacy than that the welfare of 
the whole social body should be endangered.”‘); see also Arsenault v. Carrier, 
390 A.2d 1048, 1050-51 (Me. 1978) (“Under the old ‘bastardy’ statutes, the 
mother, except where indigent, was the real party in interest.”). 
 
125See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and 
Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 347 (2011) 
(“Despite these legal and demographic changes, nonmarital children continue to 
suffer legal and social disadvantages as a result of their birth status.”). 
126There are many books and articles on this topic but for perspectives, see 
NANCY E. DOWD, , IN DEFENSE  OF  SINGLE-PARENT  FAMILIES (1999); LORI  D. 
GINZBERG , WOMEN AND THE  WORK OF  BENEVOLENCE: MORALITY, POLITICS, 
AND CLASS  IN THE NINTEENTH -CENTURY UNITED STATES  (1992). The 
influence of race as a factor for single women and mothers must be considered 
in that context as well. See Barbara Omolade, The Unbroken Circle: A 
Historical and Contemporary Study of Black Single Mothers and Their 
Families, 3 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 239 (1987). 
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doctrines when the case does not involve a constitutionally protected 
class such as fathers and husbands. But the distinction is critically 
important because there are still categories of women, particularly 
teenage mothers, who are subject to the penalties of non-marriage 
and the resulting social and economic stigma but who also may not 
be a protected class.127 
This is not, however, a discussion alone about the efficacy of 
marriage and all the truths or myths which surround that institution 
and its politics. In Ridley v. Grandison,128  a unique case (because 
Georgia allows jury trials in family law matters), a jury found a 
common law marriage valid and this finding was affirmed by the 
Georgia Supreme Court in a four to three decision. The dissent, 
however, wrote in language which describes the need for continuity 
rather than chaos regarding the institution of marriage: 
Plainly, the law of common law marriage is chaos that cries out 
for order. The materials found in the Appendix represent only eight 
years of turmoil, and only that disclosed at the appellate level. They 
reflect documentation of controversies that have been assembled 
subsequent to our case of Johnson v. Green, 251 Ga. 645 (309 S.E.2d 
362) (1983). In that case, which arose from circumstances similar to 
this case, the present writer suggested: If it be the policy of the law 
to foster marriage as an institution essential to the stability and 
health of the Republic, we ill-serve that goal by discounting the 
existence of this most important of all human relationships to a 
swearing match—akin to the question of which driver had the green 
light; or, which of two brawlers struck the first blow; or, how long 
did the pain of whiplash endure. Finally, if marriage is a state “not 
to be undertaken lightly” (as observed at almost every wedding) it 
should not be too burdensome to require of parties who intend to 
                                                                                                                                  
127See June Carbone, Morality: Public Policy and the Family: The Role of 
Marriage and the Public/Private Divide, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV.267, 269 
(1995) (“While many societies overtly attempt to enforce chastity (public 
whippings, the scarlet letter), the more common mechanisms are a combination 
of adoption, abortion, shotgun marriages and the stigmatization of illegitimacy 
that effectively prevent single mothers from raising children on their own.”); 
Helen Wilson & Annette Huntington, Deviant (M)others: The Construction of 
Teenage Motherhood in Contemporary Discourse, 35 J. OF SOC. POL’Y 59, 69 
(2006) (“The presentation of teenage motherhood as a significant social or 
public health problem at a time of declining teen birth rates in the UK, US and 
NZ highlights the ideologies underpinning contemporary beliefs about welfare 
dependency and social inclusion which inform contemporary social policy in 
this area.”). 
128Ridley v. Grandison, 389 S.E.2d 746, 746 (Ga. 1990) 
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commit their very lives to each other that they make plain to all the 
world such an intent by undergoing a ceremony of marriage.129 
The dissent articulates the policy discussions and social 
preferences cited in this article but perhaps not in support of its 
thesis. Ceremony and intent, not deception or honest error, are the 
touchstones for equity and equitable doctrines for centuries based 
upon reliance and representation to the community (and the IRS).130 
Thus, marriage does matter for many reasons to society.131 In the not 
so distant past, even the status of marriage provided restricted 
economic or legal protection for women.132 But it is the modern 
economic partnership formed by a marriage which benefits society 
and children’s stability in home and community and provides, 
concomitantly, direct and collateral benefits from taxation to health 
insurance to pensions to spousal support.133 
                                                                                                                                  
129Id. at 749 (Weltner, J., dissenting) 
130See Snetsinger v. Montana University System, 104 P.3d 445, 451 (Mont. 
2004) (“Common law marriage in Montana is an equitable doctrine used to 
ensure people are treated fairly once a relationship ends. Under our common 
law, such a marriage is established when a couple: 1) is competent to enter into a 
marriage, 2) mutually consents and agrees to a common law marriage, and 3) 
cohabits and is reputed in the community to be husband and wife. A closer 
examination of common law marriage in Montana discloses that the concept is 
designed, in part, to prevent an unjust economic harm to couples who have held 
themselves out as husband and wife as our common law marriage cases typically 
deal with the equitable distribution of economic benefits after the death of one 
of the parties or separation of the relationship.”) (citations omitted). 
131For a review of the argument related to marriage and its economic and social 
consequences, see Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational 
Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1333 (1998) (“Stable families fulfill many 
functions that the state would otherwise be required to provide at greater cost 
(such as the care of sick and elderly members). Most importantly, children 
benefit if their parents’ marriage endures. Traditional law gave marriage a 
highly privileged status, and opting out was extremely costly. While marriage 
continues to carry some legal privileges, the trend is clearly toward less 
differentiation between married couples and cohabiting couples or single 
persons.”)). 
132See e.g. In re Reben, 342 A.2d 688, 691-92 (Me. 1975) (“At common law a 
married woman had no separate identity before the law. In the eyes of the old 
common law, a husband and wife became one person upon marriage and that 
person was the husband.”); but see id. at 699 (Dufrense, C. J., dissenting) (“It is 
true that ‘the common law is not in its nature and character an absolutely fixed, 
inflexible system, like the statute law. It is rather a system of elementary 
principles and of general juridical truths, which are continually expanding with 
the progress of society, and adapting themselves to the gradual changes of trade 
and commerce, and the mechanic arts, and the exigencies and usages of the 
country.’”) (citation omitted). 
133Nobel Prizes have been awarded on the topic of valuing contributions to 
households and society. See Victor R.  Fuchs, Nobel Laureate: Gary S. Becker: 
Ideas about Facts, 8 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 183 (1994). 
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The challenge of modernity and the design of social welfare 
policies should be much more about supporting partnerships which, 
decades of economic research makes plain, foster familial and social 
stability. Americans, after all, are a nation of rights-qua-rights but 
with a powerful drift these days away from any concomitant 
responsibility to each other or society. The courts, and federalism’s 
authority, however, play a role in reinforcing equity and equality of 
rights and responsibilities; a role which should not be lightly 
ignored in a society which proselytizes in favor of marriage.134 Even 
in the very famous (though vastly over-valued and under influential) 
“palimony” case of Marvin v. Marvin,135 the California Supreme 
Court noted that, “Lest we be misunderstood, however, we take this 
occasion to point out that the structure of society itself largely 
depends upon the institution of marriage, and nothing we have said 
in this opinion should be taken to derogate from that institution.”136 
It may seem odd to finish this article with reference to Marvin 
when its media influence so outweighed its policy impact, but it was 
ahead of its time and it did change public thinking about marriage 
as contract outside religious proscriptions.137 Though prescient as to 
societal changes, the law has not yet caught on to the consequences 
of divesting partners who, unlike Marvin, were more than a sheer 
contract but an intentional matrix of choices and behaviors. A 
legally-recognized and binding marriage is an enforceable 
partnership made by such choices and behaviors; not an “end round” 
the law in which a public partner (and parent) is a “sucker”138  falling 
                                                                                                                                  
134See Roderick M. Hills Jr, Towards a Universal Field Theory of National 
Private Rights and Federalism, 76 MONT. L. REV. 41, 53-54 (2015) (“We the 
people are often deeply divided about matters of fundamental cultural 
importance. We’re divided by sex, the education of children, marriage, 
abortion—religious matters, really. These are issues of intrinsic rather than 
instrumental importance—good and evil—for which compromise and 
negotiation are psychologically painful, and the risk of dogmatic insistence on 
your point of view is unusually high. And if you live in that world, of hot red 
and bright blue divisions, a rational Congress would leave such matters to state 
governments. Because they would realize they cannot possibly resolve these 
kinds of issues at the national level.”). 
135557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
136Id. at 122. 
137See footnote 42, supra. Some scholars have given Marvin credit for an impact. 
on the marriage debates. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, Legal Treatment of 
Cohabitation in the United States, 26 L. & POL’Y 119, 126 (2004) (“While many 
states have adopted the Marvin approach, other states reacted with alarm to the 
long and messy Marvin litigation, especially because it required the court to 
examine and weigh highly intimate details of the couple’s relationship.”). 
138This term is drawn from an interesting article. See Cynthia Lee Starnes, 
Mothers as Suckers: Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse, 90 IOWA L. REV. 
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speedily and without any rights into a dark hole where equitable 
doctrines disappear. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
1513, 1552 (2004) (“Equally available is a reform model based not on relief for 
suckers, but on rights for partners. Partnership casts mothers as full stakeholders 
in a joint venture, infusing reform discourse with an egalitarian vocabulary free 
of stigmatizing conceptions of husbands and wives. Moreover, partnership 
establishes a baseline of spousal equality-in contribution, in responsibility, in 
right-against which all inequalities must be justified, all old law tested for its 
ability to fit within a gender-neutral paradigm.”). 
